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DECLINING AMERICAN POWER 
 James Russell Wiggins
A period of world history marked by rising American 
power has passed. We enter an era of diminishing American power.
We have gone over a continental divide, an historical 
watershed, and have, as yet, only dimly perceived the alteration 
of the landscape through which we move, noting but tardily that 
a descent has commenced, long after the turning point of our 
journey. Slowly, the unmistakable signs of lessening altitude 
will make themselves felt upon our consciousness in a thousand 
discernible ways.
It is a new experience for Americans. Hitherto, they 
have been travelling upward. Nothing in the American past 
conditions the people for the altered environment, a new direction, 
a decline of power.
It is futile to debate whether the change is good, bad, 
or indifferent. It is idle to try to go back on the path we have 
taken and locate the point of departure from the upward climb.
The beginnings of rising American power are far back 
in our history. It could be dated from the War of 1812 when the 
Independence of the country from Great Britan was really finally 
sealed in conflict. Decade after decade, power gathered about the 
North American state. Suddenly the nation assumed its continental 
proportions and took its place among the great powers of the world. 
World War I finally heralded its full arrival upon the international
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stage. World War II found the country not only present on the 
world stage, but dominating it. The postwar years confirmed that 
predominance.
Then the country began to tire of a great power role.
Whether the disillusionment was wholly the result by Indo China, 
or flowed, as well from a multiplicity of other causes, will be 
debated by historians of the future. In any case, citizens conditioned 
by generations of rising American power began to grow disenchanted 
with the responsibilities of power.
Quite swiftly, Americans began to be acutely aware of the 
anguish of great power. Quite deliberately, American legislators
have begun to dismantle the nation’s power and influence abroad.
They have responded to a rising American distaste for the exercisej
of power. All the great train of consequences that flow from the
possession and use of power began to dismay Americans. They were
increasingly disenchanted with the hardships and inconveniences
inevitable to the role; and increasingly impatient with the 
embarrassments often incidental to it.
Steps to diminish American power followed this disillusion­
ment. They had their origin as well in the lingering historic 
contempt for imperial power going back to the nation’s birth struggles 
against imperial power’s Eighteenth Century embodiment in Great 
Britain. A substantial percentage of American citizens retained 
an inherited antipathy to great power even when their own country 
became a great power. The desperate years from 1775 to 1783 left 
a deep genetic imprint upon the American mind. A vestigial remnant 
of the ancient hatred of great national power survived the country’s 
growth to continental dimensions, its industrial expansion to world 
leadership, its overwhelming military thrust. Millions, at the
peak of American power, retained an infatuation with remembered 
virtues, purity, and merit of a  tiny country of three millions of 
people, guiltless of any designs upon the power or territory of
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others, innocent of any ambition in world affairs, and dedicated
to the enjoyment of insular and isolated happiness behind the ocean 
moats that for so long shielded the land against attacks from abroad.
The reality of American power for years made itself felt
t
in every quarter of the globe. Decisions everywhere in the world 
were for decades; .importantly influenced by estimates of what the 
United States could do and what it would do.  No one will ever
 
know how many aggressive designs were abandoned because of an
  
apprehension that they might arouse the application of American.
power. No one will ever know how many policies were undertaken 
in the expectation that American support would be forthcoming. 
American power became, and for decades remained, the single most 
important factor in the decisions of many nations, great and small.
American intervention in two world wars and an infinite 
number of lesser military affairs publicly demonstrated, this 
influence; but the existence of power exerted its weight in thousands
of instances unknown to the public,’ and- in many not known even to  
those in charge of American affairs. 
It was not just a possession of military might alone 
that was embraced in the great power influence of the United States, 
of course, but the combination of the hardware of military force 
coupled with willingness to use that physical force. The hardware 
that remains in this country still is formidable— as formidable as 
that of any other great power. The ability of the government to
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use it has been visibly altered. The anxiety of Congress to 
curb executive discretion has resulted in specific legislative  
 restraints neon executive prerogative. These restraints 2 1 0  doubt 
reflect a popular wish to restrict the executive. They may succeed 
in that, but they also may succeed in removing American military power 
as an instant and. effective element in diplomacy around the world.
And that, in the long run, may or may not serve the cause of peace.
There is.no doubt that alarum bells have rung in every
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chancellory in the world, alerting diplomats to a new fact of life
!
-- the unwillingness of the American people, and the inability of
the American executive, to match the national power potential of 
the United States against tie military potential of other countries.
President Ford recently dedicated the most powerful naval! . .
vessel in tie world, a 750 million dollar nuclear carrier. But 
six resolute raw recruits in a rusty rowboat, at the disposition of 
a purposeful executive, might weigh more heavily in the scales of 
world diplomacy than 6,000 sailors on the .most powerful vessel 
or. the high seas, commanded by an admiral who cannot command the 
pilot to take a  hard rudder right without getting the course approved 
by 500 wrangling politicians in Congress.
The force in the world, so long slowly rising over
decades, and then dramatically multiplying in the last two generations, 
now diminishes. What will be the result? What will be the result 
in the affairs of the world? What will be the result, internally, 
in the United States itself, where its millions of citizens often
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have been astonishingly unaware of how the possession and use of
national power influenced their"lives and fortunes?
The immediate result, internally, may be one of relief.
The people are well aware of the disadvantages of great power.
They are as yet, not much aware of the disadvantages of great
weakness. Probably they are pleased that the country, its power
diminishing and declining, no longer can pursue some policies they
found offensive and revolting, in pursuit of its foreign aims.
They may take some satisfaction that men in charge of national
affairs cannot do harm in remote places in the world. Perhaps it
will only slowly dawn upon them that they also have divested their
government of the power to do good.
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As the power of the United States, both absolutely and
relatively, continues to diminish, some of the disadvantage of 
diminishing power may become more apparent. There seems to be little 
popular fear of these disadvantages now.
Time may dull the irritations felt at the exercise of 
power; and sharpen a sense of the irritations aroused by the
decline of power.  Ultimately, Americans may come to weigh the
years of American power in a fashion that will cause then to believe .
that, in spite of terrors and aberrations, the influence of the 
United States on the course of world events was essentially beneficent 
and benign. The country, they may come to see, used its great power 
with moderation, and come success.  This is not presently a widely 




How successfully will it employ the lack of power?
That is the present anti future problem. And how will the lack of 
power -change the character, the attitudes, and the standards of a 
people, now as unprepared for weakness as they were unprepared for  
power at the start of World War I? It would be easy to err in making  
any estimate of how this situation will change the United States; 
but the greatest error would be the assumption that there will he 
no change at all.
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